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Practising law for rich and poor people: towards a more
progressive approach
Allan C. Hutchinson
Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada

It is 50 years since Stephen Wexler’s essay, Practicing Law for Poor People, was published.1
By any reasonable measure, this has become and remains an iconic piece. Whether he is
agreed with or disagreed with, Wexler’s arguments continue to deﬁne the terms of the
debate about the proper role and responsibilities of those who practise law for poor
people. Critics and jurists can be for or against Wexler’s account, but they cannot make
serious headway without it. As such, Wexler’s essay deserves to be celebrated and showcased as it reaches its half-century milestone. However, his ideas and their informing
assumptions about law and poverty also warrant serious reappraisal. Much has happened
since his clarion call to arms. If the plight of those in poverty remains as dire and demanding as ever, the legal and social terrain is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in regard to the formative
dynamics and on-the-ground experience of poverty lawyers. So, in the constructive spirit
of critical collaboration towards a ﬁrmer model of ‘progressive lawyering,’ it is ﬁtting to
challenge and push through on some of the primary motifs and underlying suppositions
of Wexler’s justly famous essay.
In this essay, therefore, I want to take up Wexler’s provocation to understand better ‘the
relationship of poor people and the law.’2 With the beneﬁt of 50 more years of experience,
reﬂection and theorizing, it should be possible to deepen and transform that appreciation
by taking up Wexler’s challenge to understand better how lawyers might contribute to that
crucial task. Sadly, there is little cause for optimism: old attitudes and entrenched views die
hard. Consequently, rather than re-hash the well-worn positions on what poverty lawyers
can or should do on behalf of their clients or restate the urgent need for greater public
support for poor or indigent people, I will instead look at the broader issues of how law
and lawyering contribute to the institutionalization of poverty.
My focus is on what lawyers might do to change their contribution to the institutionalization of poverty, if not do away with it entirely. In so proceeding, I will utilise Wexler’s
urgings ‘to change things so that … poverty does not entail misery’3 as a launching-pad for
suggesting a more compelling and perhaps controversial way for all lawyers, not only
those practising law for poor people, to do that. By continuing to internalise the traditional
CONTACT Allan C. Hutchinson

hutch@yorku.ca

Stephen Wexler, ‘Practicing Law for Poor People’ (1970) 79 Yale Law Journal 1049. As an aside, it is worth noting that the
editorial board at that time compromised a disproportionate number of students who went on to carve out careers as
critical legal scholars or lawyers. These included Duncan Kennedy, Susan Goldberg, Mark Tushnet, Nancy Gertner and
Rand Rosenblatt.
2
Id. at 1051.
3
Id. at 1053.
1
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role and responsibilities of lawyering, all lawyers will not only fail to confront the debilitating nexus between law and wealth, but also actively work to perpetuate it and its debilitating eﬀects. Changing society is not the sole burden of the have-nots and their lawyers
(if they have one); it is imperative that the privileged haves and their lawyers take up that
burden and responsibility as well.

Professional advocacy and lay advocacy?
The overall thrust of Wexler’s argument is very Fitzgeraldian – ‘Let me tell you about the
very rich: they are diﬀerent from you and me.’4 Wexler’s attention, of course, is on the very
poor or what might now be called ‘the underclass.’ He makes a compelling case for appreciating how poor people live very diﬀerent lives to others and for what this means for those
who practice law on their behalf. The traditional understanding of the lawyer’s role is
based on the middle-class idea that people’s lives run more or less smoothly and that
people’s use of lawyers is occasional and exceptional. On such an understanding, the
lawyer’s brief is to resolve temporary inconveniences (or even crises) and allow people
to get on with their lives; this includes property purchases, wills, and family matters. As
Wexler persuasively insists, ‘poor people do not lead settled lives into which the law
seldom intrudes; they are constantly involved with the law in its most intrusive forms.’5
For poor people, legal problems are a way of life; they do not interfere with life, but
deﬁne and constitute it. As such, the Wexlerian lawyer must grasp that ‘a case-by-case
injustice is not what poor people face; they confront a host of unjust institutions, acting
for and within an unjust society.’6 Apolitical engagement in social struggles through
law is a luxury that poverty lawyers and their clients simply cannot aﬀord.
When lawyering for poor people, this means that the traditional shibboleths about professional responsibility – client independence; technical expertise; political neutrality; and
individualized attention – do not apply and, if they do, result in bad lawyering. To adopt
such a traditional and detached approach is to fall into the seductive trap of ‘middle-class
humanism.’7 For Wexler, the poverty lawyers’ major undertaking is to help poor people
help themselves: ‘it is better for poor people to acquire new skills than new dependencies.’8
In line with this, the lawyer should be a teacher as much as a help-mate. At its most blunt,
this entails the injunction to ‘help them do their thing, or get out.’9 Indeed, Wexler casts
the poverty lawyer in the role of a committed mentor who must develop and cultivate in
their clients the skills and techniques of the lay advocate. This can be achieved by writing
manuals and by ‘educating groups for confrontation.’10 As such, the poverty lawyer is as
much an enabling facilitator as a front-line professional.
This is stirring stuﬀ. Not surprisingly, it remains controversial even among the ranks of
poverty lawyers as well as the broader legal community.11 In its best light, Wexler’s
F. Scott Fitzgerald, ‘The Rich Boy’ in All The Sad Young Men (1926).
Wexler, supra. note 1 at 1050.
Id. at 1059. See generally Pleasance and Balmer, ‘Justice and the Capability to Function in Society’ (2019) 148 Daedalus
140.
7
Id. at 1054.
8
Id. at 1055.
9
Id. at 1065.
10
Id. at 1056.
11
Other leading voices are by Gerald P. Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering: One Chicano’s Vision of Progressive Law Practice (1992);
Lucie White, ‘Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G.’ (1990) 38
4
5
6
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outlook can be viewed both as a disruptive polemic against the legal profession and as a set
of instructions to be faithfully followed. Indeed, if lawyers are to do the kind of organizational work that he recommends, most lawyers are not that trained in such skills. Moreover, there is no guarantee at all that their untutored and amateur talents in teaching such
a specialized mode of advocacy will not do as much harm as good; social workers might
well do a better job. Also, Wexler is perhaps too harsh on do-gooders, those who become
poverty lawyers out of liberal guilt or to bolster their own personal esteem. He is adamant
that it is insuﬃcient to engage in poverty lawyering if the lawyer’s motivation is to ‘feel
useful … [and] to do his own thing.’12 This seems to be a very high bar and might have
the counter-productive eﬀect of discouraging new lawyers from a professional endeavour
that is already woefully under staﬀed. It is not always the case that ‘doing the right thing
for the wrong reason’ is itself a reason to spurn the eﬀorts of lawyers who might not otherwise assist poor people at all.
All that said, because they have not withstood entirely the test of time, I want to dig a
little deeper into some of the supporting jurisprudential and ideological footings for
Wexler’s model of lawyering for poor people. In particular, I will explore and build
upon three important issues that should inform future eﬀorts to appreciate and develop
the notion of ‘progressive lawyering’ – the fractured nature of poverty and the contributing
role of law; the expansive responsibilities of lawyers who do practice with poor people; and
the importance of treating all lawyers as political activists. Throughout, my goal is not to
be so presumptuous as to provide speciﬁc recommendations for how poverty lawyers
should practice law on a day-to-day basis; those dedicated people are much better
placed than me to do that. Instead, I will oﬀer more of a jurisprudential primer on how
to think about what lawyers can and should do in the essential struggle to overcome
poverty.

Living in poverty
Wexler is very clear that being poor is not the result of some moral or personal failings by
impoverished people: ‘poor people are not poor by chance; they are not poor through lack
of personal merit; they are not poor because it is inevitable that someone be poor.’13 For
him, the plight of being poor, especially in rich North American countries, is not something that aﬄicts discrete individuals as individuals, but is a question of structural and
group factors because poor people ‘confront a host of unjust institutions, acting for and
Buﬀalo Law Review 1; Anthony V. Alﬁeri, ‘Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Narratives’
(1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2107; Peter Gabel and Paul Harris, ‘Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal
Theory and the Practice of Law’ (1983) 11 N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 369. For a survey of the diﬀerent
waves of poverty lawyering after Wexler, see Anthony Alﬁeri, ‘Inner-City Anti-Poverty Campaigns’ (2017) 64 UCLA Law
Review 1374.
12
Id. at 1061 and 1063. The response to Wexler’s ideas are largely favourable and can be divided into two streams. A clinical
stream that speaks from in-the-trenches experiences; see, for example, Shauna Marshall, ‘Mission Impossible: Ethical
Community Lawyering’ (2000) 7 Clinical Law Review 147; Juliet Brodie, ‘Little Cases on the Middle Ground: Teaching
Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics’ (2009) 15 Clinical Law Review 333. An
historical stream that evaluates how poverty lawyering responded to neo-liberal or neo-conservative governmental
reforms; see, for example, Ingrid Eagley, ‘Community Education: Creating a New Vision of Legal Services Practice’
(1998) 4 Clinical Law Review 433; Eduardo Capulong, ‘Client Activism in Progressive Lawyering Theory’ (2009) 16 Clinical
Law Review 109.
13
Wexler, supra note at 1052.
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within an unjust society.’14 The eﬀect of treating poverty as a moral rather than political
issue is that the poor are stigmatized as being lazy, unmotivated, weak-willed, proﬂigate,
and authors of their own fate. Such a characterization, allows the more privileged to feign a
posture of helplessness and to recommend resolutions that ignore the collective and public
sources of poverty. Indeed, if poverty has any moral or immoral salience, it is to be found
in the routines and rationalizations of the rich and propertied. As Wexler sharply
expresses it, ‘poor people are poor because some people who are not poor believe that
it is a good thing to have some poor people around.’15
In North America, one of the richest regions of the world, the extent and persistence of
poverty has reached alarming proportions. Relative poverty rates are reasonably stable
around 14% (45 million people) of the population in the United States and 7% (5
million people) in Canada. While Canada does better than the United States, even absolute
poverty rates remain entrenched at around 2%.16 Since 1970 (when Wexler was writing),
poverty rates have actually worsened. All this is thrown into even sharper relief when it is
appreciated that the gap between the richest and the poorest sectors of society has been
steadily rising: whereas the top 10% have more than doubled their wealth since the
1980s, the bottom 10% have had their relative wealth reduced. Of course, these ﬁgures
are social averages; the outcomes vary considerably across diﬀerent groups. For
example, in the United States, against a general social average of 15%, 24% of all Hispanics
and 26% of all African-Americans are living in poverty.17 One of the most extreme manifestations of poverty is homelessness; this aﬄicts as many as 500,000 people nightly.
However, as these ﬁgures imply, one of the most profound insights of the last 50 years
has been that aggregating poor people into one homogeneous group or underclass is a
serious mistake. Although it has never gained much traction in North America, the invocation of ‘class analysis’ as a decisive ploy in political analysis and argument is no longer
viable. The reductionist politics of class struggle and a rich/poor mentality fail to respect
suﬃciently diﬀerences of race, gender, and background in its totalizing critique and any
future march to improved social justice. The diversity of poverty-stricken people today
strongly suggests that there will need to be diﬀerent strategies of learning and response
from one sub-group to another. The literature on ‘diverse lawyering’ is rich and suggestive;
it challenges squarely the traditional tendency to view ‘the client’ as a fungible one-sizeﬁts-all mould into which very diﬀerent people with very diﬀerent contexts and diﬀerent
needs can be poured.18 In dealing with poor clients, therefore, lawyers will need to
eschew universalistic judgments and standardized strategies in favour of more tailored
initiatives that respond in less across-the-board ways to the particular needs of their
diverse clientele. If the problem is complex and varied, so must the solution be.
14

Id. at 1059.
Id. at 1052. For my own fuller take on this, see Allan C. Hutchinson, ‘Les Misérables Redux: Law and the Poor’ in It’s Too Late
To Stop Now: Life, Law And Lore (2019) 185–212.
16
As the labels suggest, ‘relative poverty’ is measured within and across a particular society, but ‘absolute poverty’ is
measured on a global scale. See James E. Foster, ‘Absolute versus Relative Poverty’ (1998) 88 The American Economic
Review 335–41.
17
U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the United States (2015) <http://www.cwp-csp.ca/poverty/just-the-facts/>. See,
for example, Jeﬀ Madrick, Invisible Americans: The Tragic Cost of Child Poverty (2020).
18
See, for example, Sue Bryant and Jean Koh Peters, ‘Five Habits for Cross-Cultural Lawyering’ in Kimberly Barrett and
William George (eds), Race, Culture, Psychology, and the Law (2005), 47–62. However, it is equally important that
‘class’ or wealth does not get overlooked in recognising and understanding diversity. See, for example, Richard Thompson Ford, Rights Gone Wrong: How Law Corrupts The Struggle For Equality (2011) 142–43.
15
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While such group-sensitive tactics and sensibilities are needed, this does not mean that
Wexler’s emphasis on collective action should be set aside. The upshot of this analysis is
that, if poverty is to be substantially reduced, understanding and action must itself be
taken along similar structural lines; case-by-case treatment will do little to alleviate,
let alone eradicate the problems of being poor. In planning and organizing such collective
action, lawyers must accept that they are part of, not apart from, the basic structures that
hold poverty in place. As privileged operatives of the established order, lawyers must
acknowledge that, as a group, they are major sub-contractors in the political enterprise
of maintaining socio-economic relations and wealth disparities; their professional ideology
and action helps to constitute and hold in place existing social relations and oﬃcial institutions. This is not to say that any and all lawyering and legal action is doomed to such a
conservative and even reactionary fate. But it does recommend that lawyers tread very
carefully when they take on the kinds of causes and clients that Wexler talks about. Progressively-minded lawyers must always be alert to the dangers and pitfalls of tackling
poverty through the legal process; short-term gains come at the considerable price of reinforcing the long-term legitimacy, centrality and prestige of the law as a force for social
good. History, at best, teaches caution about such progressive eﬀorts.
It can be fairly reported that lawyers have done a poor job at obliging law to appreciate the
importance of wealth and poverty to matters of social justice. For instance, the courts have
read and applied constitutional rights in line with a negative neo-liberal agenda; they have
resisted eﬀorts to incorporate social rights and to recognize ‘wealth’ as an equality issue.
Both the American and Canadian courts have toyed with the idea of recognizing such
social rights, but have been unwilling to go too far down that road. In both the United
States and Canada, activist eﬀorts were made to protect and develop government social
assistance programmes by bringing them within the constitutional framework. After an
initial success at conferring protective rights on welfare recipients, courts conﬁrmed that
there was no constitutional obligation for the state to support poor persons.19 In recent
years, this restrictive attitude has been on full display in the context of health care.
Courts have relied upon a deep and informing ideology in which the state not only has
no particular obligation to provide health care to poor people, but also it must not interfere
with the rights of individuals to make their own health care arrangements.20 This has a massively disproportionate eﬀect on poorer people who have little choice other than to rely on
government to obtain basic health care: health care becomes one more commodity to be sold
and secured in the marketplace where the poor have little leverage or power.

Changing responsibilities?
When it comes to overcoming poverty, Wexler brooks no disagreement about the fact that
the primary responsibility for overcoming poverty lies with poor people themselves: ‘if
19

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254 (1970) and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In Canada, the story is much the
same, see Gosselin. v. Quebec, [2002], 4 SCR 429 and Canadian Bar Assn. v. British Columbia, 290 DLR (4th) 617
(2008). For the most compelling account of welfare rights in constitutional thinking, see Frank Michelman, ‘The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword on Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment’ (1969) 83 Harvard
Law Review 7.
20
See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 US 519 (2012) and Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 SCR 791.
For a compelling account of constitutional law’s role in all this, See Adam Cohen, Supreme Inequaltiy: The Supreme Court’s
Fifty-Year Battle for a More Unjust America (2020).
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poverty is stopped, it will be stopped by poor people.’21 By this, I take it to mean that poor
people themselves must challenge not only the deprivations and debasements of poverty,
but also the very existence of poverty itself. While he insists that this is a collective, not
individual responsibility, he leaves no doubt that ‘poverty will not be stopped by people
who are not poor.’22 There is much merit to this view–poor people will have to play a
major and perhaps decisive part in any eﬀort to confront and destabilize the social structures and systemic dynamics of poverty. However, it seems that placing the complete
burden on poor people is both unduly onerous and unnecessary. Already weighted
down by their poverty, poor people are ill-suited to ﬁght such a battle single-handedly:
a broader coalition of forces can and should be marshalled.
It is a strategic error to argue that ‘poverty will not be stopped by people who are not
poor.’23 Unless ‘people who are not poor’ (i.e. the rich and upper middle-class) are implicated or involved directly in the collective struggle to eradicate poverty, the chances of any
success are substantially reduced. As with confronting and resolving most social problems,
the privileged need to acknowledge their participation, implicit and explicit, in perpetuating the status quo and its injustices. More pertinently, they also must be made to recognize
and accept that the beneﬁts that are entailed by their privileged position are inextricably
tied to the negative eﬀects and disadvantages experienced by poor people and under-privileged persons generally. Although much eﬀort and imagination is given to separating the
one from the other, the reality is that privilege and disadvantage as well as wealth and
poverty are ﬂip-sides of the same social coin; they feed oﬀ and on each other.24 The challenge must be to change that brand of social coinage.
It is imperative, therefore, that the perpetrators of injustice are disabused of their selfserving ignorance and enlisted, where possible, in the progressive struggle to change things
for the better. Again, history is replete with examples of how the victims of injustice have
combined with enlightened segments of the privileged class to eﬀect positive change.
Slavery and women’s lack of suﬀrage were brought to an end by an alliance of diverse
forces, not by the disenfranchised alone. Whereas the former had Abraham Lincoln
and his Northern supporters, the latter had Theodore Roosevelt and his political allies.
This is not in any way to devalue or marginalize the primary eﬀorts of the victimised
group. Nor to lionize such privileged leaders. As Wexler insists, the poor must be fully
integrated into and lead the struggle against poverty: any campaign against poverty
‘[must] be fully controlled by poor people.’25 Nevertheless, to leave poor people entirely
to their own eﬀorts, initiatives and fate is to reduce, not enhance the risk of improvement.
If the problem is collective and not only individual, society itself must be rallied to take
action.

21

Wexler, supra note 1 at 1053.
Id. at 1053.
23
Id. at 1053.
24
In an important sense, this is the most signiﬁcant diﬀerence between relative and absolute measures of poverty. See
supra note **. The former (and more revealing) indicator speaks to people’s comparative position and status within a
society; the more resources a society has and the more unequal their distribution, the greater the relative disparity
will be. In a short note (that is more about philosophy than lawyering), Wexler recognises belatedly this interrelatedness
of wealth and poverty. See Steve Wexler, ‘Some Further Reﬂections on Poor People and Law’ (2007) 40 UBC Law Review
859.
25
Id. at 1066. For a contrary stand, see Rebecca Sharpless, ‘More than One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in
Progressive Legal Advocacy’ (2012) 19 Clinical Law Review 247.
22
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As such, it is unwise to relieve others, especially the privileged (i.e. white, male or
wealthy), of the responsibility to bring about substantial change. Those with privilege
must be brought to account and mobilised to remedy widespread wrongs. Barring revolution, some involvement or, at the very least, passive acceptance by the indiﬀerent elite is
required to bring about systemic or structural changes. So, if the existence and spread of
poverty is to be resisted, the most eﬀective action, along with other similar measures,
would be the introduction of a more highly redistributive tax scheme. This is no easy
task. However, it is hard to envisage how such a change could be engineered by poor
people alone. While organisation and protest by poor people will be essential, that in
itself will not deliver the changes needed. As the history of the Great Depression of the
1930s shows, it was only when the establishment began to respond to poor people’s appalling plight with Roosevelt’s New Deal package of reforms and programmes, albeit delayed
and inadequate, that some change occurred. Again, this is not to praise the rich and privileged or sideline the eﬀorts of poor people, but it is to explain how change requires a
more social-wide and collective initiative, even if it is in the nature of noblesse oblige. In
short. It demands structural changes in the regulation and arrangement of legal services.26
A signiﬁcant portion of the social, economic and political elite comprises or is serviced
by the legal profession. By virtue of their professional standing and institutional status,
lawyers are well placed to participate in that struggle against poverty and to activate the
push for such structural and systemic changes. Of course, it is essential that lawyers do
not take over the lead role in that struggle: lawyers should not become merely the mouthpieces for their clients’ views or use their clients as soapboxes for their own preferred
causes. For instance, the integrationist impetus of much American civil rights litigation
of the 1960s and 1970s failed to respect the political demands of blacks for local
schools over which black communities could exercise some control: the lawyers’ visions
overwhelmed and took precedence over the clients.27 While lawyers have a role to play
in the struggle for greater social justice, all of Wexler’s powerful reasons for demanding
that poor people are front-and-centre in any struggle, legal or otherwise, must be
heeded by lawyers and others. No matter how fervent or sincere their motivations,
lawyers must remember that it is their role ‘to help poor people do their thing, not …
to do [their] own thing.’28
Nevertheless, mindful of that stricture, the ambition of progressive lawyers should be to
establish the lawyer-client relationship as a conversational microcosm of democratic
culture in which both lawyers and clients can share, learn, and change. This might
result in a plan of action that will suggest a mutually viable way of proceeding; talking
must only be a prelude to action. Of course, this would not be anything as pretentious
or preposterous as the right thing to do. Experience teaches that what counts as a just
means to achieve a just end will be ﬂuid and context-speciﬁc; there is no one tried-andtrue approach to progressive lawyering.29 However, lawyers must do more than help
See, for example, Noel Semple, ‘Access to Justice: Is Legal Services Regulation Blocking The Path?’ (2013) 20 International
Journal of the Legal Profession 267.
27
See DA Bell Jr., ‘Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation’ (1976) 85
Yale Law Journal 470. For a restrained account of how lawyers might become civic campaigners, see William Simon, The
Practice of Justice (2000).
28
Wexler, supra note 1 at 1063.
29
See, for example, Robert Vischer, ‘Legal Advice as Moral Perspective’ (2006) 19 Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 225;
Allan C Hutchinson, Fighting Fair: Legal Ethics for an Adversarial Age (2015).
26
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poor people ‘do their thing, or get out.’30 Lawyers have a role to play in helping poor
people decide what is their own thing and how it might be put it into eﬀect; lawyers’ professional and up-close knowledge of the structures of power is a valuable complement to
poor people’s existential understanding of the deprivations and indignities of poverty.

Across the board
In calling lawyers to professional arms, Wexler is focussed on the work and approaches of
those lawyers who practice law for poor people. This is all well and good as far as it goes.
However, like many others, he categorises such lawyers as having special duties and
responsibilities over and above that of other lawyers in addressing and helping to
change the ‘misery’ that poverty entails.31 The fact is that this position, like the poor
people that they serve, puts all the responsibility on such lawyers and, as a corollary,
ignores the role that all lawyers play in maintaining the existence of poverty and should
play in overcoming it. As major operatives for and within the established order, the
legal profession as a whole has some degree of accountability for the laws and decisional
structures that help to create and perpetuate poverty; the law that exists is, in large part, a
function of the arguments that lawyers make. Indeed, the pervasive notion that lawyers
can and should practice in a detached and apolitical manner must be abandoned.
Taken to its more obvious conclusion, Wexler’s account hints at, but does not follow
through on such a destabilizing alternative.
The insistence that lawyering is a neutral exercise that does not implicate lawyers in any
political process or demand a commitment to any particular ideology is as weak as it is
wilful. Such an image is a profoundly conservative and crude understanding of what it
is to engage in the business of courts, legislatures, and the like: it accepts and works
within the bounds of the status quo. Lawyers tend to confuse legal justice with social fairness. Indeed, the power and prestige of lawyers ﬂows from their professional allegiance to
the state’s oﬃcial laws and existing institutions; lawyers are the enlisted custodians of the
status quo. However, lawyers’ broader duties encompass a more justice-based rationale. It
is surely incumbent upon lawyers to stand up for what is in the public interest and to
address wrongs, single or systemic, that prevent the legal process from becoming a
justice system. This mandate should apply not only to lawyers practicing for poor
people, but also to lawyers throughout society. As with so much else, Martin Luther
King Jr. hit the nail on the head – ‘injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.’32
By standing by while injustice occurs (or even aiding in its continuation), the legal profession is implicated in those injustices.
Wexler warns that lawyers must tread carefully as it is ‘often the government that a
poverty lawyer will oppose in his client’s interests.’33 It is true that the government will
have an enormous impact on the lives of poor people and that lawyers for poor people
will often have to confront government’s bureaucratic oﬃcials and procedures.
Wexler, supra note 1 at 1065. See also William Simon, ‘The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty
Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era’ (1994) 48 University of Miami Law Review 1099.
Id, at 1053.
32
Martin Luther King, Jr. ‘Letter From Birmingham Jail’ in I Have A Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World
(James M. Washington ed. 1992).
33
Id. at 1051.
30
31
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Nevertheless, this is a blinkered view of the causes and conditions of poverty. In the
struggle against poverty, it is often the case that government, for all its faults and failings,
might be the only friend or support that poor people have. More importantly, this depiction of the primary dynamic of poverty as that between poor people and government is to
ignore and let oﬀ the hook the vast apparatus of private power and wealth. Without incorporating that elite and the lawyers who practice for rich people and organizations, the
heart of the problem (and its likely remediation) is being ignored and thereby excused.
Granted, this should come as no surprise because society’s important and fundamental
constitutional rights are only actionable in the public, not private sphere.34
In contrast to the traditional model of lawyering, a progressive view recognizes and
insists that all lawyering is political in that who receives legal services, how they are delivered, and what results are produced has enormous implications for the balance of power
and inﬂuence in society. This is especially so in regard to wealth and poverty; lawyers have
nowhere to stand or serve that does not implicate them in the existing allocation of economic and social power. Whatever they do, lawyers are either working to maintain the
status quo (or even worsen it) or they are part of the struggle to change and improve it.
The eﬀect of the standard model of lawyering enables lawyers to obscure and ﬁnesse
that fact; the pretense of being apolitical and non-committed fools only the complicit.
In short, it is not only Skid Row lawyers that are taking a political stand, so are Wall
Street lawyers and even Main Street lawyers; the only diﬀerence is not whether they are
political or not, but the nature and cut of those political commitments.
By urging this very non-traditional understanding of lawyers’ collective responsibility,
it is simply to take seriously the informing preamble to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct – a lawyers is ‘a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice … [and] should seek improvement of the law, access to the legal system, the administration of justice and the quality of service rendered by the legal profession.’35 It would be
naïve to believe that such an invocation will have any practical, let alone radical eﬀect. But
it puts the responsibility upon the legal profession at large to demonstrate why that formal
exhortation is not merely window-dressing or ideological ﬂuﬀ. Lawyers are protected by a
state monopoly and, therefore, might be expected to advance the public interest, even if
what amounts to ‘the public interest’ is itself highly contentious and the unavoidable
stuﬀ of political contestation. There is no ‘technical’ place upon which lawyers can
stand aside from political engagement and from which they can function in a purely professional style. Consequently, lawyers of all stripes and varieties must take responsibility
for the cases that they take and the causes that they pursue. Being a lawyer ought not
to be an abdication of responsibility for the justice of theirs and the law’s work, but an
embrace of it.
Of course, asking lawyers to assume such responsibility is not at all guaranteed to
produce results that will comply with the logic and leanings of progressive lawyering.
There are as many or more lawyers who are happy with or, at least, tolerant of the
status quo as there are those who are troubled by it. That said, adopting a more publicly-oriented view of lawyering will oblige lawyers to justify what they do and why they
34

See supra, pp**–**. The basic claim is that the successful appeal to constitutional rights would only be used to combat
government and ‘state action.’ See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 US 1 (1973) and Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
35
ABA, Model Code of Conduct, Preamble (1983).

12

A. C. HUTCHINSON

do it. It does not direct lawyers to do any particular kind of lawyering or take on any particular kind of client. In this sense, it squares with the more traditional account of ethical
lawyering. But what it does do is ask lawyers to come clean about whether they are one of
those ‘people who are not poor [and who] believe that it is a good thing to have some poor
people around.’36 Unlike others in society, lawyers cannot simply pass the buck; they
cannot pretend that it is someone’s else problem and that their work has no eﬀect in stymieing the eﬀorts to ameliorate or eradicate poverty. Lawyers must accept that whatever
they do, wherever they do it, and whoever they do it for will have political consequences;
there are no fences to locate and sit on when it comes to poverty and its eradication. By
working for rich people, lawyers are signalling that they are content with or suﬃciently
untroubled by the status quo that entrenches poverty and its deprivations and indignities.

Conclusion
Lawyers have little option other than to work within the existing legal process. After all, it
is a profession of law. Yet that does not mean the wholesale adoption or rejection of the
legal order as a process for eﬀecting substantial social and transformative change. Progressive lawyers must be entirely clear-headed and strategic in their interventions and
practices; they are obliged to tread a thin line between engaging with the system and
being co-opted by that system. In taking up the challenge of confronting poverty and
all the misery it brings, Wexler realized that and laid out his own particular strategy for
lawyers who have poor people as clients. In particular, he eschewed the appeal of a
‘middle-class humanism’37 and warned of the dangers of dabbling for those with a dogood professional state of mind. Instead, he challenged lawyers to put poor people
before their own professional and personal interests. As such, his robust and challenging
essay remains a touchstone for all those who practice law for poor people. This short essay
on Wexler’s contribution after 50 years has sought to reinforce his message and to add a
few extra twists and turns for those who wish to continue to practice in the Wexlerian
spirit.
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